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ANAPHORIC ONE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
JOHN PAYNE GEOFFREY K. PULLUM
University of Manchester University of Edinburgh
†BARBARA C. SCHOLZ EVA BERLAGE
University of Edinburgh University of Hamburg
The nominal anaphoric element one has figured prominently in discussions of linguistic na-
tivism because of an important argument advanced by C. L. Baker (1978). His argument has been
frequently cited within the cognitive and linguistic sciences, and has provided the topic for a chain
of experimental and computational psycholinguistics papers. Baker’s crucial grammaticality facts,
though much repeated in the literature, have not been critically investigated. A corpus investiga-
tion shows that his claims are not true: one does not take only phrasal antecedents, but can also
take nouns on their own, including semantically relational nouns, and can take various of-PP de-
pendents of its own. We give a semantic analysis of anaphoric one that allows it to exhibit this
kind of freedom, and we exhibit frequency evidence that goes a long way toward explaining why
linguists have been inclined to regard phrases like the one of physics or three ones as ungrammat-
ical when in fact (as corpus evidence shows) they are merely dispreferred relative to available
grammatical alternatives. The main implication for the acquisition literature is that one of the most
celebrated arguments from poverty of the stimulus is shown to be without force.*
Keywords: complement-modifier distinction, relational nouns, nominal anaphors, genitive con-
structions, stimulus poverty, language acquisition, linguistic nativism
1. INTRODUCTION. Suppose it were the case that English anaphoric one was required to
have a phrasal antecedent headed by N, and was not allowed to take just a noun as an-
tecedent. Suppose further that positive evidence for the possibility of phrasal antecedents
existed but was too scarce in children’s input to affect acquisition, and that children never
received direct evidence that noun antecedents were forbidden. And suppose children
nonetheless acquired tacit knowledge of the facts rapidly and easily. It might be reason-
able to see the situation as enhancing the plausibility of LINGUISTIC NATIVISM—the view
that at least some linguistic knowledge is innate. Specifically, we might argue that we had
support for the existence of innate knowledge of certain facts about noun phrase struc-
ture, anaphoric elements, and their antecedents.
The idea of an argument along these lines was set out more than three decades ago in
a scientifically serious and well-regarded textbook on transformational grammar by
C. L. Baker (1978:413–25; see also 1979:571–74), before the coining of the term ‘ar-
gument from poverty of the stimulus’ (Chomsky 1980:34). Baker’s argument is clearly
presented and worthy of close attention.
It has certainly received much subsequent mention, but not close critical attention.
The voluminous linguistic literature on linguistic nativism has unfortunately just re-
peated in abbreviated form what Baker said, virtually always giving the same three or
four invented example sentences that Baker relied on in his textbook. There has been no
* This article originates in a confluence of two independent lines of research, one by Pullum and Scholz on
stimulus-poverty arguments and the other by Payne and Berlage on one-anaphora. We thank the audiences at
Brown University, Yale University, Newcastle University, the University of Manchester, the University of
North Carolina, the Lancaster ICAME conference (Payne & Berlage 2009), and the Boston ISLE conference
(Payne & Berlage 2011) for their questions and comments. Pauline Jacobson and Laura Kertz were particu-
larly helpful to us. Barbara Scholz, who was the first to notice the mutual relevance of the two research pro-
grams, died in May 2011 before this article was completed; the other three authors bear all responsibility for
remaining errors in the text (and we thank Zoltan Galsi, whose careful reading enabled us to avoid some of
them).
Printed with the permission of John Payne, Geoffrey K. Pullum, & Eva Berlage. © 2013.
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effort to verify the crucial facts about antecedence possibilities; there has been hardly
any effort to support the claim that the allegedly scarce data is indeed scarce, or that it
is crucially needed; and there has been little attention to the crucial matter of the se-
mantics of anaphoric one.
Moreover, the substantial psycholinguistic literature over the last ten years that has
attempted to confirm Baker’s conjectures empirically has also been based on uncritical
adoption of his data and analysis, and has neither probed the reliability of his claims nor
developed an accurate picture of what it is that gets acquired.
We begin with a review of Baker’s argument in detail (§2), and then distinguish three
distinct items spelled one, noting that Baker confused two of them in his argument (§3).
We go on to exhibit corpus evidence that Baker’s key claim about the facts is false:
phrases like the one of physics (with student as antecedent for one) are grammatical and
copiously attested. This leads to a further observation: that the empirical facts show the
distinction between complements and modifiers of nouns to be unfounded. There is no
rational way to motivate drawing the distinction between them.
In §4 we provide a new syntactic and semantic analysis of anaphoric one. We assume
no structural differentiation of the phrases formerly classified as either complements or
adjuncts: all nouns are treated grammatically as nonrelational until they combine with a
dependent. The semantic relationship holding between head and dependent in any given
context of utterance is determined by a mixture of world and contextual knowledge. Cer-
tain relations are more probable than others, and these are the ones that have given rise
to the notion of some nouns being inherently relational and taking complements. Ana-
phoric one is just a regularly inflected noun with a special anaphoric role and can itself
have either a nonrelational or a relational meaning depending on the meaning of its
antecedent.
We next consider why linguists have been so ready to believe that expressions such
as the one of physics are ungrammatical (§5). The explanation lies largely in frequency
effects. In a variety of contexts, anaphoric one competes with other anaphoric expres-
sions, and the expressions that are deemed ungrammatical are simply those in which
anaphoric one is a generally less successful, though not impossible, competitor. This
explanation applies not only to expressions like the one of physics, but also to a variety
of other expressions that have at some point been deemed ungrammatical, for instance
expressions such as three ones, where anaphoric one occurs with a numeral determiner.
Finally, we return to the issue of acquisition in §6 and point out that the falsity of the
factual basis is not the only problem: investigators have repeatedly altered their as-
sumptions about what has to be acquired, so they are frequently at cross purposes. None
of the works in question have assumed the correct adult system. We conclude with some
remarks about the working relationship between the linguistic and psychological sci-
ences that will be needed if we are to develop a proper understanding of the details of
first language acquisition (§7).
2. THE RECEIVED WISDOM. Baker (1978) holds that anaphoric one can never have a
lone N as antecedent. Rather, it must have an antecedent that is a phrasal constituent of
a category that he calls Nom (for NOMINAL): the N′ of X-bar theory. We follow his nota-
tion, which happens to coincide with that of Huddleston & Pullum 2002.1
We take phrases like the student of chemistry to be labeled noun phrase (NP). An NP
has a Nom as head, and student of chemistry is a Nom. We posit a category of DETERMI-
1 For those who endorse the ‘DP hypothesis’, the relevant constituent is, confusingly, labeled NP; but noth-
ing substantive hangs on the fact that we do not assume that hypothesis here.
NATIVES (D),2 to which the belongs. Thus the structure of the student of chemistry would
be as in 1.
(1) NP
D Nom
the N PP
student P NP
of Nom
N
chemistry
In an NP like the student of chemistry with short hair, the PP of chemistry is standardly
taken to be a complement, but with short hair is a modifier. Modifiers are not sisters of
N, but sisters of Nom, so the structure of this second NP would be as in 2, with an addi-
tional Nom constituent.
(2) NP
D Nom
the Nom PP
N PP P NP
student P NP with Nom
of Nom AdjP Nom
N short N
chemistry hair
Crucially, Baker claimed there was a grammaticality difference between the two sen-
tences in 3.
(3) a. The student of chemistry was more thoroughly prepared than the one of
physics. (Baker 1978:415, ex. 14b)
b. The student with short hair is taller than the one with long hair.
(Baker 1978:419, ex. 23)
2 Notice that we distinguish the category D, to which words like the and every belong, from the function
‘determiner of’, which can be filled by either a D (as in the house) or a genitive NP (as in John’s house).
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The difference is that 3a is supposed to be ungrammatical because it has no Nom to act
as antecedent for one. The sole Nom constituent in the subject NP (see 1) includes
not only the head noun, student, but also the complement, of chemistry. By contrast, 3b
does have a suitable Nom, because student with short hair has the structure [Nom [Nom
[N student]] [PP with short hair]], and the inner Nom can serve as antecedent so 3b is
grammatical.
Baker had actually made his observations almost a decade earlier, and pointed them
out to George Lakoff, who used them as part of the data for section II of his paper
‘Global rules’ (1970). Jackendoff (1977:59), agreeing with Lakoff, proposes a con-
straint banning a Nom consisting of ‘one(s) of NP’. He notes, however, crediting a per-
sonal communication from Noam Chomsky, that no similar constraint holds for PP
complements headed by prepositions other than of. For example, sentences like 4 are
grammatical.
(4) Arguments with Bill are less fruitful than ones with Harry.
(Jackendoff 1977:61, ex. (i) in n. 4)
If the with-PP after a noun like argument is a complement, as the parallel with VPs like
argue with Bill suggests, then Baker’s general claim that one cannot have a comple-
ment-taking noun as antecedent had already been shown to be false before he published
it. Throughout more than four decades of literature, however, the alleged ungrammati-
cality of 3a was taken to be secure.
3. THE SYNTACTIC FACTS.
3.1. THE THREE ITEMS SPELLED one. English has three distinct lexemes with one as
their orthographic base form. They differ morphologically, syntactically, and semanti-
cally. We summarize their properties in 5.
(5) The three items spelled one in English
a. Pronoun
CATEGORY: regular third-person singular indefinite pronoun
INFLECTION: one (plain case), one’s (genitive case), oneself (reflexive)
MEANING: ‘an arbitrary person’ (compare French on, German man)
NOTES: As with pronouns generally, no plural form.
b. Determinative
CATEGORY: indefinite cardinal numeral determinative
INFLECTION: uninflectable
MEANING: ‘1’ or ‘some’ or ‘a(n)’ or ‘sole’
NOTES: Obligatory when functioning as determiner. Omissible when
functioning as modifier with the meaning ‘sole’. Anaphoric
to a whole NP when used with no head noun.
c. Noun
CATEGORY: regular common count noun
INFLECTION: one (plain sg.), ones (plain pl.), one’s (gen. sg.), ones’ (gen.
pl.)
MEANING: Anaphoric; something like ‘instance thereof’, referring back
to some type or class referred to in the discourse or salient in
the context.
The item we are concerned with is 5c, the count noun, which is referred to as onect in
Huddleston & Pullum 2002 (where the determinative is tagged oned).3 Like any other
3 The two items are called oneN and oneQ by Jackendoff (1977:60).
regular noun, onect has four inflected forms (three of them pronounced identically). Its
anaphoric use is illustrated in 6.4
(6) a. The art museum in Bilbao is the most impressive one I’ve seen.
b. An honest local government official is harder to find than a corrupt one.
c. The long, gently curved Victorian railway station building in York is the
finest one in the whole of England.
In 6a the most plausible assumption about the antecedent for one would be art mu-
seum—surely not art museum in Bilbao (to call the Guggenheim the most impressive
museum in Bilbao would be an understatement). In 6b, the plausible antecedent is local
government official (not honest local government official, which would involve a con-
tradictory interpretation). And in 6c it is Victorian railway station building, or perhaps
just railway station building, but not long, gently curved Victorian railway station
building (and certainly not long, gently curved Victorian railway station building in
York, which would render 6c trivially true).
These examples illustrate a point to which we return in §6 when considering the ar-
guments for linguistic nativism: the antecedent of anaphoric one can indeed be a multi-
word Nom, but it does not have to be the largest Nom available.
3.2. CONFUSION OF COUNT NOUN WITH DETERMINATIVE. It has gone unremarked in the
linguistic literature, so far as we know, that Baker confused two of the items listed in 5.
Although the quantity of data he considered was very small, his original example illus-
trating a multiword Nom as antecedent involves the wrong lexical item. The invented
sentence he gave was 7.
(7) John has a blue glass, but Alice doesn’t have one.
The occurrence of one in 7 is not the noun; it is the determinative. Notice that it does not
have a plural form (*Alice doesn’t have ones). The constituent whose repetition it
avoids is not the Nom glass or the Nom blue glass; it is the entire NP a blue glass.
Baker has used the anaphoric noun onect to illustrate the claim that onect cannot take just
a noun without its complement as antecedent, but has used the indefinite determinative
oned to illustrate the claim that onect can have a multiword antecedent. The sentence in
7 has no bearing on this second claim.5
It is not possible to treat onect and oned as a single lexeme: they are of different syn-
tactic categories, and (as Jackendoff notes) one inflects and the other does not. But in
any case, collapsing them would mean changing the claim about anaphoric one to a dif-
ferent one: that the antecedent is either a Nom or a full NP. This is not what Baker was
proposing.
This descriptive error is not of primary importance: Baker’s argument could be rebuilt
with different examples (e.g. John has a blue glass, but we couldn’t find another one for
Alice, where the point would be that another one can mean ‘another blue glass’). How-
ever, Baker also makes a different descriptive error that is much more serious. It concerns
not the permissibility of multiword Nom antecedents but the alleged impermissibility of
noun antecedents.
4 There are derivative nonanaphoric uses, as in the great ones of mathematics, or military personnel and
their loved ones.
5 Jackendoff (1977:60–61) notes the distinction between onect (oneN) and oned (oneQ), but makes a double
mistake in discussing the facts: he claims that the quarts of wine and the ones of water is ungrammatical (we
give evidence below that such phrases are well formed) and that it contains oned (it does not; it contains
onect—hence the presence of the determinative the—so it does not support his claim about why such a phrase
would be ungrammatical).
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3.3. CORPUS INVESTIGATION. Jackendoff observed that onect can indeed replace a lone
N before prepositional phrases headed by with (as in 4). He proposes to preserve
Baker’s claim about lone N antecedents by narrowing it to PPs headed by of (henceforth
of-PPs). One might think of going further, in fact, and hypothesizing that of-PPs are the
only true complements of nouns. This would preserve Baker’s claim that nouns on their
own can never be antecedents for onect, provided sentences like 3a are genuinely un-
grammatical. Unfortunately, there is no possibility of maintaining such a thesis: corpus
data refutes it overwhelmingly.
Payne and Berlage (2009) undertook an extensive study of the relevant data. They had
independent reasons—the nativism issue was not on their agenda. They were interested
solely in gaining insight into the complement/adjunct distinction. What they found was
that nouns serving as antecedents of onect in isolation from their of-PP complements were
abundant. The semantic relation between the head noun and the of-PP had clear effects
on the frequency of such constructions, as we review below, but they concluded that there
was no clear place to draw a line between complements and modifiers.
Payne and Berlage’s corpus investigation was based on the British National Corpus
(BNC), a 100-million-word corpus of British English (henceforth BrE) from the later
part of the twentieth century. Approximately 90% of the texts are written, from a wide-
ranging variety of sources, and 10% are spoken. For the purposes of this investigation,
the version used of the BNC was BNCweb (CQP Edition).6
Two searches were employed. The first extracted all occurrences of the plural form
ones followed by of. After spurious hits were eliminated, this yielded 127 plural tokens
of onect. Searching for singular tokens of onect in the same environment is complicated
by the potential confusion with oned: examples of the type oned of the X are extremely
common. But since onect is a count noun it must be preceded by a determiner when sin-
gular, and also the form one generally cannot represent oned if preceded by an adjective.
Isolating all sentences containing the sequence ‘determinative + adjective + one + of ’
yielded a further 408 genuine singular tokens of onect.
From the total of 535 they excluded six examples in which onect was a nonanaphoric
subcomponent of an invented proper name, as in the Great Ones of the land. They also
excluded eleven examples in which onect was followed by an oblique genitive, that is,
an of-PP in which the dependent NP stands in the genitive case, since these represent an
entirely distinct construction. Each of the remaining 518 tokens of onect followed by of
was then examined to isolate the semantic relation between the antecedent noun and
the of-PP.
We use the conventions of Huddleston & Pullum 2002:474–77 as an informal nota-
tion for the semantic relations involved.
(8) eyes of the team manager
h (head) d (dependent)
d has body-part h
In an example such as 8, eyes is the head noun, symbolized by h, and the team manager
is the dependent NP, symbolized by d. The term DEPENDENT covers both complements
and modifiers, and avoids the necessity for making any prejudgment at this stage as to
which semantic relations underlie the syntactic relation of complement. In 8, the se-
mantic relation is then a body-part one: d has body-part h.
In total, the 518 examples of onect followed by a dependent of-PP were analyzed as
representing, at a relatively coarse level, thirty-five distinct semantic relations between
6 The CQP edition of the BNC (http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk) was developed by Sebastian Hoffmann and
Stefan Evert.
head and dependent. For illustrative purposes, we make the simplification of grouping
these into fourteen broader semantic fields, each of which is represented in examples
9–22 below. The antecedent, together with the semantic relation identified between
head and dependent, is indicated in braces following each example; the BNC locator is
given in parentheses.
(9) Object-like dependent
a. This interpretation is contrary to an accepted [one of wrestling] as a sport.
{interpretation; d is undergoer of h} (CGY 1,308)
b. How the printers had got hold of her photograph she did not know, but
they had, and now it was being sold all over London, along with [ones of
Lillie Langtry and other noted belles].
{ photographs; d has depiction h} (HGE 1,398)
(10) Function noun
a. Nephrite contains a high proportion of magnesia and a considerable [one
of lime].
{ proportion; h is amount of d} (FBA 470)
b. Seventy years of Byrd on record must have given us a good 50 versions of
Ave verum corpus but not a single [one of Deus venerunt gentes].
{version; h is type of d} (J1A 1,344)
(11) Part-whole
a. … she gently raised her eyebrows until her eyes met the disconcerted
[ones of the team manager].
{eyes; d has body-part h} (HGM 204)
b. I hope this little titbit of news about the crews that were formed and espe-
cially the [ones of Rosie’s Riveters] …
{crews; d has associated part h} (H5J 59)
(Rosie’s Riveters was a World War II US airplane)7
(12) Agentive
a. Suddenly the river was full of plunging bodies going to the rescue, bark-
ing dogs and screaming girls mingling their cries with the masterful [ones
of the menfolk].
{cries; d is performer of h} (ACK 2,535)
b. The German keyboard tablatures—Elias Ammerbach’s (Leipzig, 1571
and 1575), those of Bernhard Schmid the elder (Strasbourg, 1577) and
Jacob Paix (Lauingen, 1583), and the manuscript [ones of Christoph Loef-
felholtz (Tuebingen, Univ. Bibl., Mus. ms. 40034) and August Noermiger
(1598, idem, 40098)]—consist almost exclusively of vocal transcriptions
and dances of various nationalities.
{German keyboard tablatures; d is creator of h} (GUH 755)
(13) Control
… and to shift the costs from the more visible budgets of the services to
the less visible [ones of the individual] …
{budgets; d is controller of h} (AS6 944)
(14) Content
… the decision whether to categorize such questions as [ones of law or
fact] is a matter on which opinion, both judicial and academic, differs.
{questions; h has content d} (GU6 948)
7 Rosie’s Riveters is wrongly transcribed in the BNC as ‘[gap:name] Rivetus’. We have replaced this with a
corrected transcription.
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(15) Human properties
a. … we invest hospital medicine with technical powers additional to those
more home-spun [ones of the GP], but we attribute those powers to the in-
stitution rather than the person.
{ powers; d has human property h} (CMS 612)
b. … his attitude to women and their problems had always been the conven-
tional [one of the young aristocrat he had once been].
{attitude to women and their problems; d has mental response h}
(HGE 595)
(16) Context
a. It is surprising to find that the soft-bodied jellyfish have any fossil record
at all, but in fact they have the longest [one of the phylum].
{ fossil record; d has history h} (AMM 139)
b. … they point us away from the epistemological frame of reference of this
chapter towards the socio-cultural [one of the next].
{ frame of reference; d has context h} (FA3 955)
(17) Physical content
a. … and doors in which the original toughened glass panels have been re-
placed by more serviceable [ones of sturdy plywood].
{ panels; h has composition d} (GUR 19)
b. … drinking from skin water-bottles and smaller stone [ones of ale or
whisky].
{bottles; h is container of d} (A0N 580)
(18) Time and space
a. … constituting a trigger for the crash which separates the period of over-
heating from the subsequent [one of mass unemployment and stagnation].
{ period; h is timespan of d} (K8U 2,080)
b. … that lies between the outer road of St Helen’s and the inner [one of
Spithead].
{road; d is location of h} (BNB 1,115)
(19) Representative
Jesus is the Christ, the anointed [one of God].
{ person (inferred); d has representative h} (CEJ 763)
(20) Causation
… the tears, Dexter felt, were as much [ones of laughter] as of despair.
{tears; h has source d} (G1W 1,995)
(21) Categorization
a. The new commercial brewery will be the only [one of its kind] in Worces-
tershire.
{brewery; h has type d} (K1R 192)
b. It might take in all the farms in valley, parish or district. I have been on
[ones of 100,000 acres].
{ farms; h has size d} (EER 1,448)
(22) Partitive
a. She scooped up the bits of spilt polystyrene in her hand and dropped them
into the waste-paper basket. I’ll get a new [one of these] when we move.
{waste-paper basket; h is subset of d} (ABX 3,324)
b. The administrator, Tilahu Walle, says they are the lucky [ones of the
200,000 people in the area who need assistance].
{ people in the area who need assistance; h is subset of d} (B73 1,179)
To summarize, there is an abundance of examples in which onect is anteceded by a sin-
gle noun (or indeed multiword Nom) followed by an of-PP to which it stands in some
kind of semantic relation. In order to save a vestige of Baker’s claim that onect cannot
have a complement-taking noun as its antecedent and take complements of its own (al-
ready, we remind the reader, delimited by restriction to the preposition of ), it would be
necessary to claim that none of these of-PPs is licensed by the antecedent noun or Nom,
and that they are all to be treated as modifiers rather than complements.
3.4. Of-PPS AND SEMANTIC RELATIONS. A defender of Baker might propose that only
those of-PPs that stand in an appropriate semantic relation to an inherently relational
noun are genuine complements. Thus, student in Baker’s original example 3a would be
inherently relational because it is a nominalization of the verb study, and study is a two-
place predicate, one of whose arguments is the entity studied. And indeed, it has occa-
sionally been argued in the post-Baker syntactic literature on onect, notably by Oga
(2001) and Panagiotidis (2003), that there are two distinct prepositions of: the first would
be functional/semantically empty and introduce complements of nouns that themselves
are claimed to be inherently relational, and the second would be lexical/meaningful and
itself denote the appropriate semantic relation with an inherently nonrelational noun.
Only this second type of of would be compatible with onect.8
However, this defense does not work. If the noun student is inherently relational, then
nouns such as interpretation in our example 9a must also surely be relational. The noun
interpretation is a nominalization of the verb interpret, and what is interpreted presum-
ably has the same argument role for the noun as it does for the verb. Nominalizations
such as these have been unequivocally considered as relational in the semantic litera-
ture from Grimshaw (1990:66) onward.
The same might be said of photograph in example 9b: a photograph is an image of
something, the thing that has been photographed. So why is photograph not also an in-
herently relational noun? Syntacticians since Jackendoff (1977) have in fact long been
aware of the fact (an embarrassing one for Baker’s argument) that picture nouns ( pic-
ture, photograph, portrait, etc.) readily serve as antecedents to onect with a dependent
of-PP denoting the depicted image. The usual response has been not to reconsider
Baker’s claim, but rather to suggest that the of-PP must be a modifier rather than a com-
plement; see, for example, Panagiotidis 2003:285–86. However, formal semanticists,
such as Vikner and Jensen (2002:197), who tend not to focus on or even mention the
properties of onect, have no hesitation in considering picture nouns as relational. Just
like other relational nouns, they lexically encode a relationship between two entities.
In fact, if we turn to the substantial semantic literature on relational nouns (for a sam-
pling, see DeBruin & Scha 1988, Barker & Dowty 1993, and Barker 1995, 2011), it is
not just the nouns in 9 that are treated as standard examples of relational nouns, but also
the nouns in 10 and 11. These would be nouns that denote functions, such as proportion
in 10a and version in 10b,9 and nouns that are involved in part-whole relationships, in-
cluding specifically body-part terms, such as eyes in 11a, and more general part-whole
relations, such as crew in 11b.
8 Panagiotidis (2003) cites an unpublished 1989 manuscript by Andrew Radford as the source for the idea
that the behavior of onect can be explained by assuming that there are two different prepositions of. Also,
again apparently following Radford, Panagiotidis uses this idea for yet another change to the Baker acquiren-
dum by arguing (correctly) that onect belongs to the lexical category N, not the phrasal category Nom. The
reason that onect supposedly does not occur with a following complement would then be that, as a pronomi-
nal, it could not itself inherently be relational.
9 This group is not intended to be coextensive with the set of nouns that Löbner (1985) dubbed ‘functional
nouns’, a type of relational noun whose relational argument represents a unique entity.
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Consider next a noun like cry in 12a: this takes an agent argument, just like the verb
cry. Agents, as opposed to patient/theme arguments, are often conceived of as ‘external’
rather than ‘internal’, that is, standardly realized by subjects in clause structure and
’s-genitives in NP structure rather than by objects in clause structure and of-PPs in NP
structure. That is, in X-bar theory and its derivatives they would be specifiers rather
than complements. But this ignores the fact that agent arguments can be, and often are,
expressed by of-PPs in NP structure. An example like the cries of the menfolk is a case
in point. The alternation between the ’s-genitive and of-constructions is known to be
motivated by a variety of disparate factors, of which the semantic relation involved is
only one (see for example Rosenbach 2002, Hinrichs & Szmrecsanyi 2007). Other im-
portant factors are the length, animacy, and discourse status of the dependent. Payne
and Huddleston (2002:473–78) argue that the set of semantic relations in principle ex-
pressible by of-PPs is in fact a proper superset of that expressible by the ’s-genitive con-
struction; that is, there is no ’s-genitive semantic relation that cannot also be expressed
by an of-PP, given an appropriate combination of other factors.
There is less consensus in the semantic literature as to the status of the other nouns in
12 and 13 where the of-PPs stand in a creator or controller relation to the head.10 At first
sight, it might seem that nouns like tablature in 12b or budget in 13 must be inherently
nonrelational, and that the appropriate creator or controller relation is contextually sup-
plied by the of-PP. This is indeed the essence of the pioneering analysis of creator and
controller relations in ’s-genitive constructions by Barker (1995:51), and the basis of
many formal semantic treatments of creator and control relations since (in particular a
series of papers by Partee and Borschev; see Partee & Borschev 2003 for discussion).
It is worth pointing out that it is typically assumed that the dependent in such rela-
tions must be expressed by an ’s-genitive. Thus in a simple example like John’s car, the
noun car is taken to be inherently nonrelational, and it is the dependent John’s that sup-
plies the controller relation. Nouns considered to be nonrelational are incorrectly as-
sumed to be unable to take an of-PP: thus examples like the car of John are asterisked,
and contrasted with John’s car. This is essentially the same fallacy as the one holding
that agents cannot be expressed by of-PPs. The reason that the car of John seems some-
what unacceptable is simply that one-word dependents generally, but especially in the
controller relation, strongly favor the ’s-genitive rather than the of-construction. Longer
and/or indefinite dependents are just fine (e.g. Gunmen in the Philippines ambushed the
car of a university president who police had accused of harboring communist rebels,
from the Wall Street Journal, 1987).
We might therefore simply remedy this error and make the claim that of-PPs, as in the
proposed analysis of ’s-genitives, contextually supply an appropriate semantic relation
to an inherently nonrelational head. Note that in 12b, the tablatures example, the iden-
tical creator relation is expressed first by an ’s-genitive (Elias Ammerbach’s) and then
subsequently twice by an of-PP, including the one headed by onect (the manuscript ones
of Christoph Loeffelholtz … ).
However, the nonrelational analysis is insecure even with this revision. Vikner and
Jensen (2002:210) argue that creator and controller relations are too automatic to have
10 Following Vikner and Jensen (2002), we use the more general concept ‘controller’ rather than simply
‘owner’. Consider the following examples of the noun car followed by an of-PP (both attested examples from
the BNC). In the first, the car of a passing motorist (CBC 8327), we might not know whether the driver is ac-
tually the legally registered owner of the car, but he/she must certainly be in control of it. And in the second,
the car of the Spanish consul-general in Rotterdam (HKX 2612), the consul might not own or even drive the
car in question. But he/she controls its use.
to be created anew on each occasion of utterance. For example, Melissa’s dissertation is
automatically interpreted in isolation as involving a creator relation (the dissertation
that Melissa wrote), and Melissa’s car is automatically interpreted in isolation as the
controller relation (the car that Melissa controls). More importantly, however, they also
argue that these relations cannot simply be supplied by the dependent: they must be al-
lowed to be inherent to the head.
One crucial observation is that a phrase like Mary’s former mansion has two inter-
pretations. The first (and arguably less likely) interpretation would be straightforwardly
obtainable by composing the nonrelational meaning of mansion with the meaning of
former, deriving a meaning corresponding to ‘entity that used to be a mansion’. That
meaning could then be composed with Mary’s to derive the controller relation: the
whole NP would then mean ‘the entity under Mary’s control that was formerly a man-
sion’. The second (and arguably more likely) interpretation, however, is ‘the mansion
that Mary formerly controlled’. This cannot be derived compositionally unless the noun
mansion itself is allowed to have a relational interpretation corresponding to ‘mansion
controlled by x’. The adjective former can then apply to the controller relation rather
than the building. In other words, there is good reason to think that nouns with control
or creation readings must have the potential for a relational interpretation within their
semantic representation.
We could discuss further whether the nouns illustrating our other semantic relations
are inherently relational. In some cases, the relation seems to be quite saliently associ-
ated with the noun: questions (example 14) do not exist in the absence of their content,
and powers (example 15a) do not exist without the entity in which they are invested. By
contrast, it is perhaps less saliently a property of a brewery (example 21a) that it should
belong to a particular type, or of a farm (example 21b) that it should have a particular
size. But rather than prolong the exposition by working through all of these examples,
we propose to move straight to our main conclusion in this section.
We claim that it is simply untenable to argue that all of the of-PPs in examples 9–22
are modifiers. Wherever anyone might decide to draw a line between complements and
modifiers, there will still be examples that are incontrovertibly complements. Baker’s
claim that onect cannot precede complements is simply indefensible.
3.5. TROUBLE FOR THE COMPLEMENT/MODIFIER DISTINCTION. We now note a deeper and
more radical issue raised by the corpus data. As we have noted, examples in which onect
is most plausibly treated as having a multiword antecedent are not at all infrequent; note
German keyboard tablatures (12b), attitude to women and their problems (15b), fossil
record (16a), frame of reference (16b), and in the partitive construction waste-paper
basket (22a) and people in the area who need assistance (22b). But these are examples
that, if viewed syntactically (as Baker viewed them), would require a radically different
interpretation of the Nom constituent from the one envisaged by Baker, and indeed all
syntacticians who follow the basic tenets of X-bar theory. In Baker’s analysis, head
nouns combine first with their complements to form a Nom constituent that can then in
principle be modified; it is impossible for a complement to be THE COMPLEMENT OF A
NOM. But in the data just noted, the of-PP that follows onect must be EXTERNAL to an al-
ready formed multiword unit, whether the dependents involved are themselves con-
strued as complements or modifiers. None of the proposals we might envisage to handle
this data allow Baker’s analysis to survive in its intended form.
One possibility is simply to abandon X-bar theory principles about the structural dis-
tinction between complements and modifiers, and allow dependents of any kind to
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combine not only with N but also with already formed Noms. The constituent Nom is
then simply an NP-internal phrasal category containing a head noun and any number of
dependents (except the determiner). This is, for instance, the syntactic structure for En-
glish NPs proposed by Payne and Huddleston (2002). In this conception, onect can po-
tentially have any single-word N or multiword Nom as antecedent. The analysis of
12b is 23.
(23) [[D the] [Nom [Nom German [Nom keyboard [N tablatures]]] of Christoph Loef-
felholtz …]]
But this bears little resemblance to the conception of syntactic structure at the heart of
Baker’s claim, namely that Nom is a category that in itself structurally encodes a dis-
tinction between complements and modifiers.
X-bar theory principles concerning the order in which complements and modifiers
combine might be preserved if onect were treated as anaphoric to a unit of a purely
semantic nature. In this case 12b would be analyzed as having the X-bar-consistent
structure in 24, and onect would be anaphoric to the logical form of German keyboard
tablatures (which would not, however, correspond directly to syntactic constituency
and would have to be derived by higher-order logical operations).
(24) [[D the] [Nom German [Nom keyboard [Nom [N tablatures] of Christoph Loeffel-
holtz]]]]
By the time Baker published his discussion of one (1978), the possibility that anaphoric
elements might in general best be analyzed as having logical forms rather than syntac-
tic constituents as antecedents had already been proposed by Sag (1976), and this prin-
ciple forms the basis of many modern theories of anaphor resolution, for example,
Dalrymple et al. 1991. It is a move that we endorse but that Baker did not envisage, and
it destroys the basis of any argument based on onect concerning the innateness of SYN-
TACTIC structure.
4. SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC ANALYSIS. Our syntactic and semantic analysis of onect is
based on the assumption that it is futile, at least on the basis of the behavior of onect, to
draw a binary division at a syntactic level between complements and adjuncts, or corre-
spondingly at a semantic level between inherently relational and nonrelational nouns. In
conformity with this principle, we treat all nouns and nominals grammatically as nonre-
lational until combined with a dependent. The semantic relationship that then holds be-
tween head and dependent in any given context of utterance is determined by a mixture
of world and contextual knowledge. In this conception, then, certain relations are just
more probable than others, and these are the ones that have given rise to the notion of
nouns as inherently relational and complement-taking.
4.1. THE OPTIONALITY OF NOMINAL DEPENDENTS. As an initial observation, we note
that our analysis neatly accounts for a fact that is often ignored and that clearly distin-
guishes nouns as a category from verbs, namely that there are no convincing cases of
nouns taking syntactically obligatory dependents.11 Thus king is a classic ‘relational’
noun, but nothing about the grammar of English forces us to specify the king’s realm in
a dependent. The BNC examples in 25 illustrate this property.
11 The noun sake occurs only in the fixed phrases for the sake of X and for X’s sake, and the noun dint is en-
tirely restricted to the fixed phrase by dint of X, but these are fossilized idiom parts, not ordinary nouns taking
syntactically obligatory complements. Payne and Huddleston (2002:440) state that denizen is a unique excep-
tion, but this is now known not to be true: we have found attested uses of it with no complement.
(25) a. Along the north Antrim coastal path, you can admire the work of a giant,
see the place where a witch turned a king’s daughters into swans and sam-
ple the local delicacy, dulce, which resembles burnt tagliatelle but is in
fact dried seaweed. (A5X 263)
b. A sculpture representing a king and queen was broken by the builder’s
labourer who found it, revealing that the metal of the faces was only about
a millimetre thick. (B71 470)
c. For example: each soloist need not begin with a formal bow to a king or
to the audience, nor end with another bow or considered pose; but such
behaviour may be included if the choreographer wishes to locate dance in
a particular century and probably a palace in which the story unfolds.
(A12 968)
The fact that kings are conventionally associated with a particular state is part of world
knowledge about kings, not something that necessarily forms part of the argument
structure of the noun king. The particular state involved, in this case Antrim, may be re-
trievable contextually rather than from a syntactic dependent, as in 25a. But the state it-
self may not be important, even when there is specific reference. In 25b, a particular
king and queen are represented by a sculpture, but what is relevant is simply their royal
status, perhaps identifiable by properties such as their regalia. And it is always possible
to have nonreferential statements about kings, as in 25c, where all that is relevant is the
property of being a king, not the properties of a particular king.
Although examples such as 25 show that this is generally not the case, it is some-
times argued that ‘relational’ nouns are odd when presented as first-mention indefinites
without an appropriate accompanying dependent. Vikner and Jensen (2002:209), for
example, contrast 26a, to which they prefix a question mark, with 26b.
(26) a. A brother was standing in the yard.
b. A car was parked in the yard.
In specific reference, the most likely clue to the identification of a brother is the identi-
fication of a relevant sibling. Brothers are not, like kings, identifiable by properties such
as their regalia. But this, we argue, is not a GRAMMATICAL fact. Attested examples of the
same type as illustrated in 25 are not hard to find, even with a noun like brother. Con-
sider the examples in 27, likewise drawn from the BNC.
(27) a. Another friend, whose husband is a farmer, shares the care of her parents,
who live in a neighbouring village, with a married sister, who also lives
nearby. Between them they give their mother the support she needs since
their father has had a stroke. But her mother is always distressed when she
leaves, and dismayed that she has to go before doing just one more job
to help. Fortunately, a brother and his wife take responsibility at nights,
when the mother will often ring for reassurance about her husband.
(BLW 761)
b. One old couple who were village publicans used their house as a shelter
for ‘a very composite family’ which included a daughter who did the pub
cooking, a brother, and a son who used two rooms as his tailor’s shop.
(AP7 852)
c. A trust can be charged on a brother’s posthumous child: for intention
alone is relevant in trusts, and the opinion of Gallus prevailed that the
posthumous children of others can also be our own intestate heirs.
(B2P 514)
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In 27a, the preceding context indeed supplies some information about who the siblings
are. However, this contextual information is not even contained within the same sen-
tence as the first-mention indefinite. In 27b, the contextual information that is supplied
is not even sufficient to identify precisely whose brother it is: certainly one of the ‘old
couple’, but we do not know, or need to know, which one. And in 27c, we have a non-
referential statement about a legal property of brothers as such, and no contextual infor-
mation is necessary.
We therefore regard the optionality of noun dependents as further evidence, on top of
the behavior of onect, that a uniform treatment is required for all of the semantic rela-
tions observed in the corpus. In this treatment, in essence a radical extension of the
ideas of Pustejovsky (1991) about a generative lexicon, and more specifically the treat-
ment of the control and creator relations in Vikner & Jensen 2002, all nouns can be
given either a nonrelational or an inherently relational interpretation. The resolution of
the semantic relation involved on any particular occasion depends on world knowledge
about the relative likelihood of the different types of relation that can hold between the
head and dependent, and the precise context.
4.2. SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC ANALYSIS FOR of-PPs. The noun we use to illustrate our
analysis is murder, which as a nominalization would standardly be considered to be in-
herently ‘relational’. In an example such as a brutal murder of a taxi driver,12 the se-
mantic relation between the dependent PP and the head is most likely to be that of
undergoer (i.e. d is undergoer of h), but as shown by the examples in 31 below, other se-
mantic relations are possible. Also, as argued in the previous section, the dependent PP
is not obligatory. We can simply have an NP such as a brutal murder.
An analysis tree for the simple NP a brutal murder is given in 28.
(28) <<e, t>, t>
λp[∃x[murder′(x) & brutal′(x) & p(x)]]
<e, t>
λy[murder′( y) & brutal′( y)]
<<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>> <<e, t>, <e, t>> <e, t>
λq[λp[∃x[q(x) & p(x)]]] λp[λy[ p( y) & brutal′(y)]] murder′
D Adj N
a brutal murder
For simplicity, we use a standard Montagovian semantics in which NPs are taken to
be generalized quantifiers of type <<e, t>, t>, and in which the indefinite article has a
simple predicate calculus representation. Note two points, however. First, the meaning
of the noun murder is of type <e, t>: it denotes a function from entities to truth values,
not some kind of relation between NP meanings. Second, in order to emphasize the fact
that our analysis relies solely on the logical reconstruction of antecedents for onect, we
do not assign any syntactic category labels to units above the word level. Our analysis
tree reflects solely the semantic combinatory potential of the words in the analyzed
string, and makes no claims as to whether there is any necessity for corresponding syn-
12 This example is based on an example from the BNC (locator (A8F 286)). In order to simplify the trans-
lation into predicate logic, we have changed the definite article in the original example (the brutal murder of
a taxi driver) to an indefinite one.
tactic constituents (as might be shown by constituency tests). In particular, our analysis
has no need of a syntactic category Nom to serve as a structural indicator of the com-
plement/modifier distinction. We do, however, allow analysis trees to contain a mod-
icum of syntactic information in addition to the specification of word-level categories:
they should be construed as indicating word order. We then postulate that units can
combine in any order consistent with their typing and the rule of functional application,
applied to adjacent units.13
In order to construct the logical translation of the NP, this latter principle forces the
first step to be the application of the translation of brutal to that of murder, as in 29a.
Then the translation of the indefinite article can apply to the resulting expression, giv-
ing 29b. The variables p and q are here of type <e, t>, and the variables x and y are of
type e.
(29) a. λ p[λy[ p( y) & brutal′( y)]](murder′)
= λy[murder′( y) & brutal′( y)]
b. λ q[λ p[∃x[q(x) & p(x)]]](λy[murder′( y) & brutal′( y)])
= λ p[∃x[murder′(x) & brutal′(x) & p(x)]]
We emphasize that the expression in 29a corresponding to the string brutal murder is
construed as a logical unit, not a syntactic one.
The analysis of the NP a brutal murder of a taxi driver is more complicated. In es-
sence, it represents a generalization of the type-shifting operators employed by Vikner
and Jensen (2002) to shift ‘nonrelational’ nouns like mansion into the relational type re-
quired for a compositional interpretation of expressions like Mary’s former mansion,
the interpretation in which the adjective former refers to the timing of the controller re-
lation rather than the mansion itself. But in our analysis, all nouns, including those tra-
ditionally construed as relational, have both a nonrelational and a shifted relational
type. In fact, any logical unit of the nonrelational type <e, t> can be shifted to the rela-
tional type <e, <e, t>> by a type-shifting operator of the form 30a, with the indicated
variable types. As applied to murder′ (the logical translation of the noun murder in its
nonrelational form), this yields a set of possible relational interpretations for the noun
murder, namely the set named in 30b.
(30) a. λ p[λ d[λ h[ p(h) & R(h)(d )]]] d, h: e
p: <e, t>
R: <e, <e, t>>
b. λ d[λ h[murder′(h) & R(h)(d )]]
The symbol R here is a metasymbol standing for a semantic relation between the head
(corresponding to the variable h) and the dependent (corresponding to the variable d ).
In fleshed-out meaning representations it will be instantiated as some particular rela-
tion. Semanticists will recognize the analogy with the relation R that Barker (1995) pro-
posed as holding between an ’s-genitive and a head noun in the analysis of expressions
like John’s car.
How is the instantiation of R to be determined on any particular occasion? The for-
mal semantic tradition has been to divide instantiations into two types: default interpre-
13 The view of semantic composition expressed here has strong affinities to glue semantics, for example,
Dalrymple 1999, or combinatorial categorial grammar (CCG), for example, Steedman 2011. It could straight-
forwardly be reformulated in either of these frameworks. For the purposes of this article, however, we do not
need to adopt either the glue semantics assumption that nonadjacent elements can be combined, or CCG as-
sumptions about a more extended set of combinatorial operations and a categorial syntax that is tied directly
to semantic operations.
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tations that arise from the argument structure of the noun (thus from nouns considered
to be ‘inherently relational’), and pragmatic interpretations, which are determined using
world knowledge and contextual information. In our conception, however, where no
grammatical distinction can be drawn between ‘relational’ and ‘nonrelational’ nouns, it
is correspondingly impossible to draw a coherent dividing line between these two types
of interpretation. Rather, we propose that all interpretations are based on a mix of world
knowledge and context. All relational expressions of the form R(h)(d ) are assigned a
probability based on world knowledge about the likely relations between entities of
type h and type d. The context will then determine which relation is most appropriate,
and possibly refine its content.
The relational operator is itself likely to be invoked with far greater frequency with
some nouns than with others, for example in the case of kin terms such as brother. But
in our conception this too is a matter of world knowledge and context, not a matter of
underlying argument structure. Note that if, relying on their perhaps more typical uses,
we were instead to try to identify a subset of inherently ‘relational’ nouns (a task that we
have shown to be fraught with difficulty), and we were to encapsulate the typically re-
lational nature of these nouns GRAMMATICALLY through the enforced presence of a rela-
tional argument in their underlying argument structure, we would expect at least some
of these nouns to take obligatory complements. There is a stark contrast here with tran-
sitive verbs, which genuinely do possess underlying two-place argument structures and
which correspondingly require the presence of an obligatory complement.
So what constitutes our world knowledge about murders? First of all, if a murder
takes place, we have an undergoer, and somebody dies. Given that taxi drivers are (un-
fortunately) more likely to be murdered than to be murderers, this appears to be by far
the most likely interpretation of examples like a brutal murder of a taxi driver. But
many different instantiations of R are available for the noun murder.14
(31) a. David Peace’s Red Riding Quartet, which spins a fictional plot alongside
the murders of the Yorkshire Ripper, is all the more potent for its true
crime background.
b. One of two sisters who bombed the Old Bailey in the 1970s is in custody
today being questioned about the murders of two soldiers in Northern Ire-
land in March.
c. Paul Temple is part of the era between the upper class murders of Agatha
Christie and the gritty murders of today.
d. The driving rhythms of London’s fiercely competitive cat-walks may
seem a thousand miles away from the cosy cottage murders of Miss
Marple, but they provide a perfect environment for the more chilling edge
of Agatha Christie’s short stories.
In 31a, given the world knowledge that the Yorkshire Ripper was a notorious murderer,
the most probable instantiation of R is performer, not undergoer. In 31b, performer and
undergoer might in isolation be assigned more equal probabilities, but the wider context
suggests that the undergoer relation is intended. In 31c, there are two occurrences. The
item of world knowledge that Agatha Christie is a crime fiction author yields a high
probability of the creator relation for the first, but in the second, anything other than a
14 These examples were sourced using Webcorp. URLs, accessed in May 2011, are: http://www.guardian
.co.uk/books/booksblog/2008/jul/16/gruesomecrimesmakegreatboo (31a); http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk
/2009/nov/17/arrests-murders-soldiers-northern-ireland (31b); http://www.thevervoid.com/columns/inlibtd
/paultemple.htm (31c); http://www.btscene.eu/verified-search/torrent/the-dressmaker/ (31d).
temporal relation is highly improbable. Finally, in 31d, world knowledge tells us that
Miss Marple is a fictional amateur detective, so the performer relation is refined to that
of solver rather than committer of the crime.
In order to construct a logical translation for the NP a brutal murder of a taxi driver,
we propose that the string brutal murder of type <e, t> is shifted by the relational oper-
ator 30a to the relational type <e, <e, t>>. It can then combine with the of-PP, which has
type <<e, <e, t>>, <e, t>> (a function taking as argument a function from entities to
properties and returning as value a new property). The of-PP saturates the relational ar-
gument and forms a new unit of type <e, t> corresponding to the string brutal murder of
a taxi driver. This composes straightforwardly with the translation of the matrix deter-
miner. This sequence of operations is reflected in the analysis tree in 32.
(32) <<e, t>, t>
λ p[∃x[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & murder′(x) & brutal′(x) & RO(x)( y)] & p(x)]]
<e, t>
λ z[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & murder′(z) & brutal′(z) & RO(z)( y)]]
<e, <e, t>>
λ d[λ h[murder′(h) & brutal′(h) & R(h)(d )]]
(RELATIONAL TYPE-SHIFT)
<e, t>
λy[murder′( y) & brutal′( y)]
<<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>> <<e, t>, <e, t>> <e, t> <<e, <e, t>>, <e, t>>
λq[λ p[∃x[q(x) & p(x)]]] λ p[λy[p( y) & brutal′(y)]] murder′ λO[λ z[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & O( y)(z)]]]
D Adj N (PP)
a brutal murder of a taxi driver
Of note here is that the translation of the preposition of contains a variable O, mne-
monic for of, which we take to range over the wide set of semantic relations that this
preposition permits, and which we attempt to characterize in §5.2. The preposition of is
therefore not simply meaningless. By employing a different variable, the analysis can in
principle be extended straightforwardly to any other preposition, such as for or with.
While the range of semantic relations permitted by of is wider than that of any other
preposition, it does not include every conceivable relation. For some relations, more
specialized prepositions have to be employed, and the preposition of cannot in general
substitute for these. What the variable O does is to place a constraint on the instantiation
of the metasymbol R introduced by the application of the relational type-shift operator
to the string brutal murder. This constraint is reflected by the presence of the sub-
scripted metasymbol RO in the final logical translation of the NP. The actual semantic
relation instantiated between brutal murder and a taxi driver must then be one that is
permitted by the preposition of. Readers who wish to see more detail may consult the
appendix.
This (to our knowledge novel) treatment of the way nouns combine with of-PPs dis-
poses of many of the difficulties involved in the necessity of preassigning nouns cate-
gorially to one of two basic syntactic/semantic types: relational and nonrelational. As
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Partee and Borschev (2012:447) put it: ‘The distinction is sharp, but the classification
of nouns is not’.15 In particular, we do not need to assume that noun A is grammatically
nonrelational (and requires type-shifting to a relational type when it combines with an
of-PP), while noun B is grammatically relational (and is type-shifted to a nonrelational
type when it does not). All nouns can potentially occur in relational constructions in our
scenario, and some may do so more readily than others.
4.3. SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF onect. The analysis of onect now follows
straightforwardly. Like all count nouns, onect belongs to the basic type <e, t>. We write
its translation as Ana<e, t> to suggest its status as a type <e, t> anaphor whose antecedent
must be some appropriate logical form of type <e, t>. This antecedent can correspond
either to a single noun, or to a multiword string with a noun as head—what in the ear-
lier sections of this article was referred to as a nominal. What is reconstructed is a logi-
cal unit of the requisite type, however, not a syntactic constituent.
Thus the bracketed NP in an example such as 6b, repeated here as 33a, will have the
translation in 33b.
(33) a. An honest local government official is harder to find than [a corrupt one].
b. λ p[∃x[Ana<e, t>(x) & corrupt′(x) & p(x)]]
c. λ y[official′( y) & local-government′( y)]
d. λ p[∃x[λy[official′( y) & local-government′( y)](x) & corrupt′(x) & p(x)]]
= λ p[∃x[official′(x) & local-government′(x) & corrupt′(x) & p(x)]]
The derivation of the logical form in 33b will follow the same lines as that of a brutal
murder in 28–30. The resolution of Ana<e, t> can be the translation of any contextually
available string of type <e, t>, in this case most plausibly the translation of local gov-
ernment official, given in 33c. This can simply be substituted for Ana<e, t>, as in 33d.
Nothing prevents onect from being followed by an of-PP. Like any noun, it belongs to
the type <e, t> and can be type-shifted to the relational type <e, <e, t>> by the relational
operator in 30a, as can any larger unit of type <e, t> that contains it. Thus, the bracketed
NP in example 34a will have the translation in 34b.
(34) a. An unprovoked murder in a Bolton back-street last week was followed
this week by [a brutal one of a taxi driver].
b. λ p[∃x[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & Ana<e, t>(x) & brutal′(x) & RO(x)( y)] & p(x)]]
c. murder′
d. λ p[∃x[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & murder′(x) & brutal′(x) & undergoer(x)( y)]
& p(x)]]
15 Partee and Borschev (2012:448) hold as a ‘working hypothesis’ the notion that relational and nonrela-
tional nouns are of different syntactic categories and different semantic types. The exemplificatory syntactic
diagnostics are not, however, particularly decisive. For example, both supposed contexts for nonrelational
nouns (This is (a(n)) N; This/That N is … (e.g. good )) readily accept supposedly relational ones: This is a
portrait; This portrait is good). Pauline Jacobson (p.c.) has pointed out to us a semantic diagnostic that ap-
pears superficially stronger and that she attributes originally to a UMass dissertation (Mitchell 1986; see also
Partee 1989, Asudeh 2005), namely that the supposed inherently relational nouns have a hidden argument that
is obligatorily bound by quantifiers. Thus in On Christmas Eve, every boy brought plum pudding to a neigh-
bor, the interpretation would have to be: ‘for each boy x, x brought plum pudding to x’s neighbor’. Even
though this interpretation is the most plausible one, we doubt that the bound interpretation is genuinely oblig-
atory, given the right context. For example, a different interpretation obtains if some particularly deserving
person is always given plum pudding on Christmas Eve by every boy in the town, and then on this particular
Christmas Eve because of an address error the pudding was delivered to a neighbor of the deserving person
instead. In our account, the bound reading is easily obtained by allowing the type-shifting operator to apply to
all nouns in isolation from any dependent.
The derivation of the logical form in 34b will follow the same pattern as that in 32. In
34b, there are now two unknowns that need to be resolved. The resolution of Ana<e, t>
can be the translation of any of the strings murder, unprovoked murder, murder in a
Bolton back-street, or unprovoked murder in a Bolton back-street, all of which will be
of the appropriate type <e, t>. In 34d we illustrate this resolution by assuming that this
is simply the translation of murder as given in 34c. Once this is established, world
knowledge and context will select an appropriate instantiation of RO, in this case most
probably undergoer (which we symbolize by the bold relation undergoer).
Since Ana<e, t> can be resolved by any expression of type <e, t>, including single
nouns, and RO is any semantic relation permitted by the preposition of, nothing remains
of Baker’s claim that onect cannot substitute for a lone noun. His second claim, that
onect can have both single-word and multiword antecedents, is essentially correct, but is
not one based on the syntactic postulates of X-bar theory.
5. FREQUENCY AND GRAMMATICALITY. What is it that has enabled the received wisdom
about onect to persist for so long? Why do some examples with onect continue to be in-
trospectively judged in isolation as ungrammatical by some linguists? One reason for
the persistence of the claim that onect cannot be followed by an of-PP might simply be
its frequent repetition, both in syntactic textbooks as a prime exemplar of the supposed
rationale for distinguishing complements from adjuncts, and in the psycholinguistic lit-
erature as a prime exemplar of the poverty-of-stimulus argument (see §1). Linguists
with experience with this topic have in effect been trained to believe that 3a is ungram-
matical for more than thirty years.
However, it is not just to examples like the one of physics that ungrammaticality
judgments have been applied, but also to other cases such as the supposed incompati-
bility of onect with numeral determiners in examples like three ones (Lakoff 1970,
Postal 1972).
The answer, we suggest, lies in frequency effects connected with the distribution of
onect. In a number of environments, onect is in competition with at least one alternative
anaphoric strategy that has long been established in the language and is arguably sim-
pler. In such environments, we propose that onect is not excluded by any grammatical
principles concerning its distribution. As argued above, it is just a count noun with the
same distribution as any other count noun. But as an anaphor it can lose out to other
anaphors and occur with lower frequency than its competitors—sometimes overwhelm-
ingly lower. Nevertheless, in some cases it will occur, and in the presence of other fa-
vorable factors it may even become the preferred option. We begin in §5.1 with some
general observations about the distribution of onect and its anaphoric competitors. In
§5.2 we turn to a detailed account of the frequency effects associated with the occur-
rence of onect preceding of-PPs, and in §5.3 we discuss particular meaning relations in-
volving human head nouns, including student.
5.1. THE ANAPHOR onect AND ITS COMPETITORS. The main competitor for onect is zero.
Almost all determiners (exceptions are the, a(n), and every) can function on their own
as anaphors, and where this shorter and arguably therefore simpler strategy is available
it is typically the most frequent option. Onect therefore tends to occur in NPs in which it
is not immediately preceded by a determiner. It also does not occur without dependents
(Stirling & Huddleston 2002:1515). In a sentence like I want one, one must be the de-
terminer, that is, oned rather than onect. And I want ones, in which ones has to be onect,
genuinely never seems to occur, presumably because it is invariably preempted by I
want some.
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The determiners that do not function on their own as anaphors are of course excep-
tional. The definite article readily cooccurs with onect when there is postmodification,
as in the one over there, and without postmodification as a predicative NP in examples
like That’s the one, where the pronoun it is certainly a competitor but perhaps yields
ground to onect because of the predicative environment. In nonpredicative environ-
ments the one clearly loses out to simple pronouns, but this is no reason for treating the
combination the one as ungrammatical. With the indefinite article, there is a simple and
straightforward competitor for a one: it is just the determiner oned as in I bought one
yesterday. Nevertheless, a one is not ungrammatical as such: it occurs predicatively in
examples like the BrE colloquial Ooh, you are a one!—and notice that every, which
cannot function in isolation as an anaphor, readily cooccurs with onect, as in I counted
every one.
A search of ninety-eight random examples of onect in the BNC reveals the prevailing
patterns, summarized in Table 1.16
16 For simplicity, the search was restricted to plural examples with ones. The original search was for 100
examples, of which two were discarded because they represented the plural of the number ‘1’ in multiplica-
tion tables.
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED BY TOTAL EXAMPLES WITH POSTMODIFICATION
adjective 69 10
participle 5 0
noun 4 1
none 4 4
the 11 10
these/those 4 3
which 1 0
TABLE 1. Frequency of the dependents of onect (sample of ninety-eight examples from the BNC).
In the majority of examples, onect is immediately preceded by a modifier belonging to a
major category (adjective, noun, or participle), as in the big ones. The remainder are
preceded either by nothing, or by a nonquantificational determiner, and of these almost
all contain some form of postmodification (a PP or clause), as in the ones not in the cat-
alogue. The examples where we find a determiner preceding a bare onect with no post-
modification are the ones in the predicative function discussed above (they’re the ones),
and these ones and which ones. In the latter two cases, the determiners could easily
function as anaphors without the assistance of onect. We can conjecture, however, that
the occurrence of examples like these ones may be facilitated by parallelism with the
singular this one, which focuses on the countability of the identified referent and is thus
typically differentiated from this on its own. And in the case of which ones, onect pro-
vides an indication of number that would otherwise be lacking. In other words, onect
has properties that enable it to compete on a reasonable footing with the bare determiner
in these cases.
It is difficult to apply this functional account of the distribution of onect to the deter-
miners another, each, and either, which are not frequent enough to occur in the small
sample above, but occur both with and without onect with little functional difference. I
want another one says no more than I want another, and is about half as frequent. This
behavior seems idiosyncratic.
The functional account does, however, clearly account for the infrequency with
which onect cooccurs with possessive determiners like my, you, his, and so forth, or
with quantificational determiners such as numerals. In this case, the bare determiner
overwhelmingly predominates: we find mine and five rather than my ones and five ones.
But again this does not entail that the latter strings should be deemed ungrammatical.
When a large enough corpus is investigated they do occur, and there are sometimes ob-
vious motivating factors. Taking the cooccurrence of numerals and onect as an example,
even the BNC as a whole is not large enough to provide more than the odd example
(and they are from the spoken section of the corpus). But a web search readily turns up
perfectly natural-sounding examples.17
(35) a. This atoll is on the west of Maldives and has 75 islands—13 of them are
inhabited, 57 are uninhabited including the five ones which are currently
being developed into resorts.
b. There were and still are nine bells in a row in the kitchen, about a foot
apart, ten feet from the floor, and on enquiry Major Moor learned from
the cook that the ones affected were the five ones on the right: these were
the ones situated in the dining room, the drawing room over the dining
room, an adjacent bedroom, and two attics over the drawing room.
These examples typically involve NPs with postmodification, and the presence of a
postmodifier is clearly conducive to the use of onect as an overt head to which post-
modification can be applied. In examples 35a and 35b, the analysis could start with ei-
ther the numeral or the postmodifier being construed as applying to the head first,
before the numeral.
In the small sample of ninety-eight examples discussed above, five occur with a
prepositional phrase, and of these, just a single one is an of-PP. If we extrapolate from
this sample, we can deduce that of-PPs occur in only a very small proportion of occur-
rences of onect. Nevertheless, as we have shown above, they occur quite frequently in a
corpus the size of the whole BNC. In the following section, we continue to an investi-
gation of the anaphoric competitors for onect in this data set.
5.2. FREQUENCY EFFECTS INVOLVING of-PPS. It is not the case that all of the possible
semantic relations permitted to of-PP dependents of onect occur with equal frequency in
the corpus data. The full set of thirty-five relations we identified in the corpus is pre-
sented in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2 contains those relations, many involving animate dependents, that we judge
to be expressible in principle not just by the construction with of, but also by the ’s-gen-
itive construction, as in the team manager’s eyes. By contrast, Table 3 contains those re-
lations that are expressible solely by the of-construction. The relevance of this division
will soon become apparent.
In Table 2 we give first a suggested name for the relation, for example, undergoer as
in example 9a. This is followed by an informal indication of how this relation is to be
read, identifying the separate roles played by head and dependent, as in 8 and the illus-
trative examples in that section. The third column indicates the semantic field to which
each relation was assigned for illustrative purposes, and in the fourth column there is an
attested example. In each case, we judge the relation to be expressible in principle not
only by the of-PP construction, but also by the ’s-genitive construction: for example,
alongside powers of the GP, we also have the GP’s powers.
17 The web examples in this section were sourced using Webcorp. URLs, accessed October 2012: http://
famouswonders.com/baa-atoll/ (35a); http://www.spookyisles.com/2012/07/the-bells-of-bealings-house/
(35b).
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Table 3 has an identical structure. In this case, however, we judge the semantic rela-
tion concerned not to be expressible by the ’s-genitive construction.18 Thus the very fre-
quent partitive construction has no ’s-genitive counterpart, and for examples like
questions of law or fact we do not have a corresponding *law or fact’s questions.
It is immediately apparent that the total number of examples in Table 2 (eighty-five)
is much smaller than that in Table 3 (433). Thus, in a global perspective, onect occurs
more frequently before of-PPs precisely in those semantic relations where there is no al-
ternation with the ’s-genitive construction. When there is such an alternation, the ’s-gen-
itive construction is overwhelmingly preferred when the dependent is short (one word),
definite/accessible, and animate. The examples with onect following an of-PP tend
therefore to occur when dependents are either longer, indefinite/inaccessible or inani-
mate, or embody some combination of these factors.
As an illustration, consider again example 12b, which we repeat here as 36.
(36) The German keyboard tablatures—Elias Ammerbach’s (Leipzig, 1571 and
1575), those of Bernhard Schmid the elder (Strasbourg, 1577) and Jacob Paix
(Lauingen, 1583), and the manuscript ones of Christoph Loeffelholtz (Tue-
bingen, Univ. Bibl., Mus. ms. 40034) and August Noermiger (1598, idem,
40098)—consist almost exclusively of vocal transcriptions and dances of
various nationalities.
The first underlined phrase, Elias Ammerbach’s, illustrates the ’s-genitive alternative: it
is relatively short (in this case, two words), definite, and animate. As a possessive de-
18 There may of course be idiolectal variation in some of these judgments, but the overall picture is unlikely
to be affected by such variation.
SEMANTIC READ AS TYPE EXAMPLE #
RELATION R
time (h)(d ) d is time of h TIME AND SPACE {acts} of yesterday 20
member (h)(d ) d has member h PART-WHOLE {runner} of Britain’s three-strong team 18
depiction (h)(d ) d has depiction h OBJECT-LIKE {photographs} of Lillie Langtree 9
and other noted belles
representative d has representa- REPRESENTATIVE {powerful people} of this city 8
(h)(d ) tive h
creator (h)(d ) d is creator of h AGENTIVE {tablatures} of Christoph Loeffelholtz 6
and August Noermiger
performer (h)(d ) d is performer of h AGENTIVE {cries} of the menfolk 5
location (h)(d ) d is location of h TIME AND SPACE {inner road} of Spithead 4
body-part (h)(d ) d has body-part h PART-WHOLE {eyes} of the team manager 3
associated-part d has associated PART-WHOLE {crews} of Rosie’s Riveters 2
(h)(d ) part h
controller (h)(d ) d is controller of h CONTROL {budgets} of the individual 2
inherent-part d is inherent part of h PART-WHOLE {action force} of demons and evil spirits 1
(h)(d )
undergoer (h)(d ) d is undergoer of h OBJECT-LIKE {interpretation} of wrestling as a sport 1
context (h)(d ) d has context h CONTEXT {frame of reference} of the next chapter 1
history (h)(d ) d has history h CONTEXT {fossil record} of the phylum 1
human-property d has human HUMAN PROPERTY {powers} of the GP 1
(h)(d ) property h
mental-response d has mental HUMAN PROPERTY {attitude} of the young aristocrat 1
(h)(d ) response h
subperiod (h)(d ) d has subperiod h PART-WHOLE {years} of the 19th century 1
source (h)(d ) d is source of h CAUSATION {voice} of the oral culture 1
TABLE 2. Frequency of of-PP dependents of onect: semantic relations permitted to the ’s-genitive construction.
terminer, it can function on its own as an anaphor, and it is not followed by onect. The
second underlined phrase illustrates the forced use of the of-PP alternative when the de-
terminer position is blocked by another determiner (those): in this case, length of the
dependent is not a factor. The third underlined phrase illustrates the combination of
onect and an of-PP. In this case the dependent is long (five words, not counting the sup-
plementary information in parentheses), and the presence of the prenominal modifier
manuscript blocks the use of the zero anaphor strategy.
A combination of factors may thus favor the occurrence of onect with a following of-
PP. Some of these are specific to the selection of onect as opposed to zero, in particular
the presence of particular determiners or modifiers, as discussed in §5.1. Then there are
factors related to the genitive alternation. The selection of an of-PP construction may be
forced, either because the semantic relation is one of those in Table 3 that does not per-
mit the ’s-genitive in principle, or because the use of the ’s-genitive is blocked by a pre-
existing determiner. Only those of-PP examples in which the determiner is the definite
article allow substitution by the ’s-genitive: the loud cries of the menfolk ~ the menfolk’s
loud cries. Where, however, the genitive alternation applies, factors such as the length,
definiteness, and animacy of the dependent come into play.
In order to quantify these factors, we analyzed the eighty-five examples of Table 2
using the methodology of O’Connor et al. 2013, a large-scale study of the genitive al-
ternation based on the Brown corpus of American English.19 The eighty-five examples
19 We should note that onect appears to be distinctly less frequent in American English (AmE) than in BrE.
The frequency of the plural ones in the BNC (almost all onect tokens, sporadic expressions like two ones are
two being rare) is roughly 117 per million words. The corresponding figure for the Wall Street Journal corpus
(LDC 1993) is only thirty-seven per million words, and for the Corpus of Contemporary American English
(COCA; Davies 2008) it seems to be only 7.2 per million. Nevertheless, within these overall lower frequen-
cies, the syntactic behavior does not deviate markedly from BrE. Sentences with onect followed by an of-PP
represent about 0.6% of COCA, and the range of semantic relations exhibited is much the same. For example,
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SEMANTIC READ AS TYPE EXAMPLE #
RELATION R
subset (h)(d ) h is subset of d PARTITIVE a new one of these {waste-paper 218
basket}
content (h)(d ) h has content d CONTENT {questions} of law or fact 121
kind (h)(d ) h has kind d CATEGORIZATION {brewery} of its kind 36
image (h)(d ) h is image of d OBJECT-LIKE {pictures} of a storm on Saturn 15
size (h)(d ) h has size d CATEGORIZATION {farms} of 100,000 acres 9
value (h)(d ) h has value d CATEGORIZATION {species} of greater commercial value 7
theme (h)(d ) h has theme d OBJECT-LIKE {analysis} of previous authorities 5
cause (h)(d ) h has cause d CAUSATION {tears} of laughter 5
composition h has composition d PHYSICAL {panels} of sturdy plywood 4
(h)(d ) CONTENT
age (h)(d ) h has age d CATEGORIZATION {children} of an age to be working 3
timespan (h)(d ) h is timespan of d TIME AND SPACE {period} of mass unemployment 3
container (h)(d ) h is container of d PHYSICAL {bottles} of ale or whisky 2
CONTENT
duration (h)(d ) h has duration d TIME AND SPACE {pregnancy} of 105 days 1
rank (h)(d ) h has rank d CATEGORIZATION {officers} of much more senior rank 1
amount (h)(d ) h is amount of d FUNCTION NOUN {proportion} of lime 1
collection (h)(d ) h is collection of d PART-WHOLE {group} of two figures 1
type (h)(d ) h is type of d FUNCTION NOUN {version} of Deus venerunt 1
TABLE 3. Frequency of of-PP dependents of onect: semantic relations not permitted to the
’s-genitive construction.
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of Table 2 represent the initial data set in which the semantic relation expressed by the
of-PP in principle allows the genitive alternation. It is necessary to exclude any exam-
ples where the genitive alternation is blocked by the presence of a determiner other than
the definite article: there were ten of these. The remaining seventy-five examples were
then coded for three factors: (a) animacy (animate, organization, inanimate); (b) acces-
sibility of dependent (pronoun, proper noun, common noun);20 (c) length of dependent
(one word, two or three words, four words or more). 21 The results are given in Table 4.
the following three examples from COCA have head nouns frequently considered to be relational (and many
more such examples could be cited).
(i) There are those who contend that a trophy property costs at least $20 million. And that price tends
to be the benchmark used when sales, like the recent [one of a town house on West 10th Street] for
$20 million, are reported in the media and talked over by those who like to talk about these things.
(New York Times, 30 Jan. 2011)
{sale; d is undergoer of h}
(ii) ‘Many thanks for sending me the photographs,’ he wrote to Sears from Biltmore in Ashville, North
Carolina, on August 7, 1895. ‘The new [one of Helen] has a wonderfully fine expression and
makes me feel like returning to Boston and putting my umbrella through my portrait.’ (Antiques,
Sept. 2001)
{photograph; d has depiction h}
(iii) I have observed individuals of the Negro race in whom the brain was as large as the average [one
of Caucasians]; (Natural History 104, 1995)
{brain; d has body-part h}
20 Rather than using the binary distinction between definiteness and indefiniteness as a formal proxy for the
discourse status of the dependent, O’Connor and colleagues use a hierarchy of nominal types (pronoun >
proper noun > kinship term > common noun definite > common noun indefinite), linking these distinctions to
notions of accessibility as in Ariel 2001. In their results, they omit counts for kinship terms, which occur rel-
atively infrequently (we have done likewise, and this is the reason why there are seventy-three BNC examples
in the accessibility column, not seventy-five). They also amalgamate definite and indefinite noun phrases
headed by common nouns into a single factor. The basic distinction between definite and indefinite depen-
dents is, however, shown to be significant in Börjars et al. 2013, another recent large-scale investigation of the
genitive alternation, based on the spoken sections of the BNC.
21 Under ‘organization’, we have included all animate collective nouns, for example, nouns like family.
ANIMACY ACCESSIBILITY LENGTH (WORDS)
BNC BROWN BNC BROWN BNC BROWN
freq % % odds freq % % odds freq % % odds
animate 24 32 17 1 : 8 pronoun 5 7 1 1 : 138 1 15 20 23 1 : 4
organization 17 23 13 1 : 1 proper 14 19 18 2 : 3 2–3 48 64 52 3 : 1
inanimate 34 45 70 5 : 1 common 54 74 81 6 : 1 > 4 12 16 25 39 : 1
TABLE 4. Categorization of of-PPs as dependents of onect, compared to odds ratios for the genitive alternation
in the Brown corpus.
In each case, the frequencies and corresponding percentages are compared to the per-
centages that O’Connor and colleagues found for the same factors, considered individ-
ually, in the Brown corpus, based on approximately 2,800 examples of of-PP. It is
striking that the distributions in the larger and smaller data sets are broadly consistent
with each other, at least in the ranking of the corresponding factors, and frequently in
the closeness of the actual proportions.
The main point of this comparison is that O’Connor and colleagues also give figures
for the occurrence of the alternating ’s-genitive construction, based on the same factors.
We used their figures to calculate the odds ratios for each factor in favor of the occur-
rence of an of-PP as opposed to an ’s-genitive. The important dividing line is marked in
the table, separating those factors where the odds are strongly against of-PP and in favor
of the ’s-genitive from those factors where the odds are at least closer to evens, and in
some cases strongly in favor of of-PPs. It will be noted that the distribution of of-PPs in
our data set is consistent with these odds ratios: the majority consist of noun phrases
that either are not animate, or are not pronouns, or have a word length of two or greater.
The conclusion we draw is that the properties of of-PPs as dependents of onect are not
distinct from those of of-PPs in the genitive alternation generally, and that onect itself
has no special import in this regard.
There are in fact only three examples in the data set where the of-PP contains a pro-
noun one word in length that is categorized as animate (rather than organization or inan-
imate). This is the kind of example that we would strongly predict to be an ’s-genitive
rather than an of-PP. These three examples all represent the depiction relationship: for ex-
ample, the ones of me, where ones stands for ‘photos’ and me represents the person de-
picted, rather than the controller or creator. This, we believe, is not fortuitous. It is
not just the animacy and form of the dependent that is important: the precise semantic re-
lation may also have an effect on the relative frequency of the onect + of-PP and
’s-genitive + zero anaphor constructions. Payne and Berlage (2011) investigated the rel-
ative weight of a number of semantic relations with respect to the general alternation be-
tween the of-PP and ’s-genitive constructions, with other important factors such as length,
animacy, and definiteness of the dependent controlled for. They show that, among the re-
lations in principle available to both constructions, controller most favors the ’s-genitive
while depiction most favors of-PP. Thus, examples such as the photos of me, with pro-
nouns as dependents and depiction as the intended relation, are not improbable.
Payne and Berlage (2011) also found that the body-part relation lies somewhere in
between controller and depiction. This mirrors the numbers observed in Table 2 for
these relations, with depiction showing nine occurrences for onect + of-PP and con-
troller only two. The frequencies of these relations in Table 2 are, however, far too small
to support statistical tests of significance, so we leave the correlation between the indi-
vidual semantic relations and the frequency of onect + of-PP as a plausible prediction.
If we now turn to the examples shown in Table 3, where the genitive alternation
plays no role, the potential for an alternative to the of-PP construction is considerably
more limited. In the relatively frequent partitive (subset) cases, the presence of onect is
largely determined by the presence of a premodifier. A typical example is the one given
in the table: a new one of these. As a consequence of the search methodology (see §3.3),
all of the singular examples of onect are of this type. As we would predict, the majority
of the plural examples also have premodification, but there are a couple of examples
that contain onect immediately after a determiner (where it could well have been omit-
ted): which ones of the eager faces … ?, and certain ones of these. The distribution of
onect in the partitive is thus motivated by factors other than the partitive construction
per se, and no different from the distribution of onect generally.
In the nonpartitive cases there can be an alternation between of-PP and a prehead de-
pendent, either nominal or adjectival. Thus, although we do not have *law or fact’s ques-
tions as an alternative to questions of law or fact, we do have legal or factual questions.
And correspondingly we might have legal or factual ones as an alternative to the attested
ones of law or fact. To our knowledge, there is no previous large-scale investigation
of this kind of alternation, but we can make the following observations based on our
data set.
First, the range of semantic relations that is permitted by the prehead dependent con-
struction is very broad and appears in principle to be a superset of the semantic relations
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permitted by the of-PP construction. That is, for each nonpartitive semantic relation in
Table 3, with the exception of the kind relation where structural factors prevent it (see
below), we can find at least one example where the prenominal alternant appears to be
grammatical. We illustrate this in Table 5.
In practice, the prehead alternative is in the majority of the attested cases categorically
blocked by structural factors. A prehead alternative does not exist when the of-PP is
clausal, as in an example such as the fundamental process of turning customer needs
into customer wants. The prehead constituent also cannot be a determined nominal, nor
can it contain any posthead dependent. Thus, as an alternative to detailed pictures of a
storm on Saturn, we do not have *detailed a storm on Saturn pictures. Correspondingly,
there is no prehead alternant to the attested detailed ones of a storm on Saturn. It is for
this reason that the kind examples are systematically excluded: the dependent, headed
by a noun such as kind, invariably contains a determiner. A typical example is the only
brewery of its kind in Worcestershire.
The length of the dependent is also evidently an important factor. While, we suspect,
the vast majority of prehead modifiers are single-word units rather than internally com-
plex ones, the of-PPs are typically at least two words long. Of the 179 examples that
represent the semantic relations in Table 5 (i.e. the relations in Table 3 excluding subset
and kind), only thirty-five are one word long, that is 20%, a figure similar to the pro-
portion of one-word of-PPs in the genitive alternation.
In conclusion, we have found in a detailed examination of the of-PP dependents of
onect absolutely no evidence that onect itself has any special bearing on the frequency of
occurrence of the of-PP, let alone its grammaticality. The frequencies that are observed
are essentially those we would expect given the properties of of-PPs as dependents of
nouns in general.
5.3. HUMAN HEAD NOUNS.We have not yet cited any examples of onect + of-PP where
the antecedent belongs to certain types of human head noun that are usually considered
SEMANTIC ELLIPTED NOMINAL ATTESTED of-PP PREHEAD ALTERNANT
RELATION R
content (h)(d ) questions ones of law or fact legal or factual ones
image (h)(d ) postcard the other one of New the other New Zealand one
Zealand
size (h)(d ) farms ones of 100,000 acres 100,000 acre ones
value (h)(d ) condition the only one of relevance the only relevant one
theme (h)(d ) impression a great one of Christopher a great Christopher Watkins
Watkins one
cause (h)(d ) cries ones of anguish anguished ones
composition (h)(d ) panels more serviceable ones of more serviceable sturdy
sturdy plywood plywood ones
age (h)(d ) ball the only one of similar age the only similar age one
timespan (h)(d ) period the early one of railway building the early railway building one
container (h)(d ) bottles smaller stone ones of ale or smaller stone ale or whisky
whisky ones
duration (h)(d ) pregnancy a short one of 90–105 days a short 90–105 day one
rank (h)(d ) officers ones of much more senior rank much more senior rank ones
from the miltary wing from the miltary wing
amount (h)(d ) proportion a considerable one of lime a considerable lime one
collection (h)(d ) group a short one of two figures a short two figure one
type (h)(d ) version not a single one of Deus not a single Deus venerunt
venerunt gentes gentes one
TABLE 5. Prehead alternants (nominal or adjectival) to the of-PP construction.
inherently relational. These are nouns denoting interpersonal or kin relations (e.g.
friend, brother), role nouns (e.g. king), and indeed agent nominalizations of the student
type. Such examples do not occur, to our knowledge, in the BNC. But this, we believe,
is simply a consequence of the limited size of the BNC rather than grammaticality as
such, since natural-sounding examples of the relevant kind are certainly attested in
larger corpora. We cite some web examples, identified as almost certainly produced by
native speakers, in 37–39.22 The examples in 37 illustrating interpersonal and kin rela-
tions form a new (fifteenth) semantic field. Role nouns can be subsumed under the
function noun field, however, and agent nominalizations under the object-like depen-
dent field.
(37) a. WAGs (wives and girlfriends, usually the badly behaving [ones of En-
glish sports stars])
{wives and girlfriends; d is interpersonal relation of h}
b. Both the parents of children with difficulties and [the ones of children
with a normal evolution] must be contacted to settle educational programs
that involve the family.
{ parents; d is kin relation of h}
(38) Dudley himself was no more eager for the match. Yes, he wanted to marry
with a queen, but not [the one of Scotland].
{queen; d has role with respect to h}
(39) a. Despite the rivalry between the two sides, supporters, specially [the ones
of Real Madrid] are known to show respect to the individual talents in the
opposition team.
{supporters; d is undergoer, h is agent}
b. A single company, ArkivMusic, has struck deals with all four major pub-
lishers (and [numerous minor ones) of classical music recordings] to
make their deleted records available via a burn-on-demand service.
{publishers; h is theme, d is agent}
The two examples of agent nominalizations in 39 differ in that 39a has an ’s-genitive
counterpart. It would be possible to say Real Madrid’s with a zero anaphor just as well
as the ones of Real Madrid.
Is it possible to find an example in all relevant respects like Baker’s original example
3a, with the particular agent nominalization student? Users of corpora will know that
finding specific strings is virtually impossible even for quite short string lengths (the
probability of a possible k-word string at any arbitrary point in a text being identical
with some specific string is approximately 1 in 102k). The difficulty of finding an oc-
currence is further reduced if a specific antecedent (student) is called for, given that it
may be arbitrarily distant from the occurrence of onect + of-PP. However, consider ex-
ample 40.
(40) In the case of medicine, I think there’s no other alternative than the Universi-
dad de la Republica. I would think their classes are equally crowded, but
haven’t ever heard any of the medicine students complain as much as the
[ones of computer science].
{students; h is theme, d is agent}
22 The web examples in this final section were again sourced using Webcorp. URLs, accessed variously in
May 2009 and May 2011: http://www.tefl.net/alexcase/tefl/vocab/new-words-in-the-shorter-oxford-english
-dictionary/ (37a); http://www.betterparentingarticles.com (37b); http://ladyhedgehog.hedgie.com/mary.html
(38); http://www.wikipedia.org (old entry for El Clásico) (39a); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deletion
_(music_industry) (39b); http://board.totaluruguay.com/Education/University_entrance_requirements (40).
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This example—offering advice to a North American about Uruguayan university en-
trance requirements—may be from a nonnative speaker, but the writer’s English betrays
no obvious nonnative traces and the example sounds entirely natural to us.
As we have shown in §5.2, the of-PP construction has more than just the ’s-genitive
as a competitor: there is also the possibility in many cases of employing an NP with a
simple nominal or adjectival prehead modifier. As well as the queen of Scotland (or
Scotland’s queen) in 38, we could have the Scottish queen. And as well as the support-
ers of Real Madrid (or Real Madrid’s supporters) in 39a, we could also have the Real
Madrid supporters. With agent nominalizations like student, it is the only competitor:
as well as the students of medicine, we could have either the medicine students (which
the author in 40 actually chooses for the antecedent) or the medical students.
A BNC investigation into the relative frequencies of of-PPs and prehead modifiers
with the head noun student reveals that, at least with single-word dependents, the pre-
head modifier construction very strongly predominates (see Table 6).
Length of the dependent is a relevant variable: the longer the dependent is, the more
likely the of-PP construction becomes. A survey of of-PP constructions with the head
noun student reveals that the mean length of the dependent is 2.1 words (number of ex-
amples = 423; standard deviation = 1.6). It is, therefore, in conformity with this length
principle that in example 40 the author chooses the ones of computer science over the
computer science ones.
In conclusion, there are no grounds for considering examples like the one of physics
(with student as antecedent) to be ungrammatical. No syntactic principle excludes such
phrases. They are simply a nonpreferred option given a short dependent.
6. THE IMPLICATIONS FORACQUISITION. The footprint of Baker’s arguments in the litera-
ture is huge. Textbook authors often rely on them to motivate X-bar theory (e.g. Radford
1981:92–100, 1988:174ff., Carnie 2002:122, Burton-Roberts 2011:165–70).At least five
different works by David Lightfoot and coauthors repeat Baker’s arguments in connec-
tion with arguing for universal grammar (Hornstein & Lightfoot 1981:18ff., Lightfoot
1982:Ch. 4, 1989:322f., 1991:4–8,Anderson & Lightfoot 2002:196–98). Baker’s thesis is
treated as uncontroversially established not only within psycholinguistics (e.g. Ham-
burger & Crain 1984, Crain 1991:609ff.) but also occasionally by philosophers of cogni-
tive science (see e.g. Ramsey & Stich 1991:295). There has been renewed recent theoret-
ical discussion of the facts (Oga 2001, Panagiotidis 2003, Gualmini 2007), and prolonged
debate has been stimulated since 2003 by a series of experimental papers on the early-
acquisition claim, and critiques or defenses thereof (Lidz et al. 2003, Akhtar et al. 2004,
Lidz & Waxman 2004, Regier & Gahl 2004, Tomasello 2004, Foraker et al. 2009, Pearl &
Lidz 2009).
Unfortunately, all of this work has been based on descriptive error. The facts about
anaphoric one are not as Baker assumed, and once they are properly understood not a
trace of Baker’s supportive argumentation for innateness survives.
Baker actually supplies two distinct arguments, each associated with a specific fact to
be acquired—what Pullum & Scholz 2002 calls an ACQUIRENDUM. The two acquirenda
are given in 41.
of-PP # EXAMPLES PREHEAD MODIFIER # EXAMPLES
student of physics 1 physics student 7
student of science 2 science student 6
student of chemistry 0 chemistry student 6
student of medicine 0 medical student 64
TABLE 6. Frequencies in the BNC of of-PP and prehead modifier with the head noun student.
(41) a. A single word of the lexical category N cannot be the antecedent for onect.
b. A multiword phrase of the category Nom can be the antecedent for onect.
Confirming 41a would call for negative information: that onect can never be anteceded
by a noun that has a complement (as opposed to being anteceded by the whole Nom con-
stituent containing the noun and the complement together). But nobody is ever supplied
with this information, so 41a gives rise to what Pullum and Scholz call a STIMULUS-
ABSENCE argument for linguistic nativism: nothing in the environment could directly sup-
ply the information necessary for learning. But given the evidence we have provided to
show that 41a is not true, this collapses. Nothing entailing 41a is acquired by those who
become speakers of English—and for anything entailing 41a to be innate would prevent
attainment of the adult state of knowledge of language.
To confirm 41b, by contrast, positive information could in principle suffice: if some
utterance act could convince you (by occurring in a context where nothing else makes
sense) that onect must have a multiword Nom as its antecedent, you would have learned
that multiword Nom antecedents are possible. So 41b gives rise to what Pullum and
Scholz call a STIMULUS-POVERTY argument.
Baker gave an example of the kind of rare but in-principle-accessible evidence that
would permit 41b to be learned. He pointed out that in a context where Alice has a red
glass in her hand, encountering 42 would provide relevant evidence.
(42) John has a blue glass, but Alice doesn’t have one.
One cannot mean glass here, on pain of contradicting the visible evidence; yet if it is
taken to stand for blue glass, everything makes sense. Hence multiword antecedents
must be permissible.
Baker made a mistake here. The one in 42 is not the noun; it is the determinative.
That is why the plural form would be impermissible (*John has some toys but Alice
doesn’t have ones). And the antecedent in 42 is not a Nom, but the whole indefinite NP
a blue glass. This can be remedied: we could replace 42 with something like John has a
blue glass, but we couldn’t find another one for Alice, which does have onect. It is rather
remarkable, though, that through all the repetitions of his point no one ever noticed that
Baker’s examples did not illustrate his point.
Events like hearing 42 in a context where Alice has a nonblue glass are referred to in
Akhtar et al. 2004 as BAKER EVENTS. What Baker says about them is that they ‘must cer-
tainly be extremely uncommon in a child’s early experience’. He offers no support at all
for this assertion. And in fact the frequency of Baker events remains unknown. Their
frequency might well be adequate to ensure that random linguistic experience would
soon refute the one-word-antecedent hypothesis, but there has been no large-scale study
of this; nearly everyone has been content to repeat what Baker said.
Lidz et al. 2003 is an exception. Lidz and colleagues, to their credit, attempted to as-
sess the frequency of Baker events by looking for them in corpora of speech addressed
to young children, and they claimed to have found one in the Adam corpus of the
CHILDES database and one in the Nina corpus. Unfortunately, both of their examples
(which Jeff Lidz kindly showed us) are mistaken diagnoses: they contain oned. Our own
explorations turned up a few apparent Baker events in the Lara corpus (see e.g. lines
441, 770, 912, 1179, and 1218), but we confess it can be very hard to tell from tran-
scripts of interactions with young children, and more work is needed.
It is not difficult to make a preliminary assessment of what the frequency might be in
arbitrary text, however. We examined every occurrence of one or ones in three texts to
get a rough sense of how many of them represented Baker events. What we looked for
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were instances of onect for which the only reasonable assumption given the context was
to understand them as having multiword antecedents. The results are in Table 7.
WORD COUNT one(s) onect EVENTS PER MILLION
Wall Street Journal corpus, file w7_001 160,000 262 25 6 37.5
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 26,000 78 4 1 38.5
Anne of Avonlea 90,000 173 22 3 33.3
TABLE 7. Numbers of Baker events in three texts.
What they show is that in each million words of arbitrary text we can expect about thirty-
five utterances that in effect indicate the analog of Baker events. If conversations with
children are like other kinds of text in this regard, then since children hear ten to thirty
million words before they are three (Hart & Risley 1995), one might expect three-
year-olds to have encountered between 350 and 1,000 Baker events. That is by no means
vanishingly small. Understanding some of the utterances involved might be enough
to support purely experience-based learning of the fact that multiword antecedents are
possible.
We note in addition that there is reason to doubt that a sound stimulus-poverty argu-
ment for linguistic nativism can be based on an acquirendum like 41b, and it is impor-
tant. Whether or not Baker events are common enough to be relevant, if what gets
learned is simply that onect is an anaphor of type <e, t>, then it is not clear why 41b
would ever be doubted by an unprejudiced learner: nouns and Nom constituents can
both have that type, so the learner who makes the broadest assumption, namely that
anything of type <e, t> will do, will be correct.
A further remark to be made about the developmental-linguistic and psycholinguistic
literature is that it is vitiated by frequent shifts in the presumed acquirendum, none of
them being accurate. Lidz and colleagues (2003) started out by taking the child’s task to
be to learn something like Baker’s original syntactic claim: that ‘one is anaphoric to the
phrasal category [Nom]’—a claim we have shown to be false. The way they attempted
to test whether young children assume it was to familiarize eighteen-month-old infants
with a screen display of a yellow bottle accompanied by the utterance ‘Look! A yellow
bottle!’, and then showed both a yellow bottle and a blue bottle accompanied by either
‘Now look: what do you see now?’ (the control condition) or ‘Now look: do you see an-
other one?’ (the test condition). The idea was that if the children knew that onect was an
anaphor seeking a Nom as antecedent (and not a noun), another one would be inter-
preted with one taking the Nom yellow bottle as its antecedent, so the infants would
look for longer at the yellow bottle. (See Akhtar et al. 2004 and Tomasello 2004 for de-
tailed criticism.)
The assumption Lidz and colleagues appear to make is that infants will pick the
longest possible antecedent (for, notice, bottle on its own would also be a Nom). Regier
and Gahl (2004) make this explicit in their response, exhibiting a Bayesian strategy that
could learn from positive data that one must take as antecedent a larger rather than a
smaller Nom. But that is not the generalization that competent adult speakers acquire.
Lidz and Waxman (2004:158) reply to Regier and Gahl, but restate the acquirendum
in a slightly different and nonequivalent form: ‘one is anaphoric only to syntactic con-
stituents larger than N0’, which neither entails nor is entailed by the former one. As-
suming that ‘larger’ means ‘longer’, it entails that onect can ONLY have multiword
antecedents, and that is certainly not true: onect frequently has one-word antecedents.
Pearl and Lidz (2009) present a fuller response to Regier and Gahl, but change the
acquirendum yet again, proposing: ‘Anaphoric one can take any Nom as an antecedent,
but a multi-word antecedent is preferred when it is available’ (p. 239). They claim that
‘when there is more than one [Nom] to choose from ... adults prefer the [Nom] corre-
sponding to the longer string’, and children ‘have the adult pragmatic preference to
choose the referent corresponding to the larger [Nom] string when there is more than
one [Nom] antecedent’. This too is false (as well as slightly different from all of the ear-
lier work). For instance, it is flatly contradicted by example 23 in Baker 1978:419, The
student with short hair is taller than the one with long hair. If student with short hair
were preferred over student as antecedent, the predicted interpretation would be that the
one with long hair means ‘the student with short hair who has long hair’.
Such shifts and inaccuracies wreck the chances of getting a result that bears on the
acquisition of onect or the issue of linguistic nativism. Unless the participants can agree
on what acquirendum they are talking about, they can never succeed in determining
whether its acquisition calls for innate linguistic prerequisites. And in this case not only
have the parties all picked different acquirenda, but in addition the acquirenda they
have picked do not hold in the language to be acquired.
In sum, psycholinguists working on anaphoric one have (i) failed to validate the
claim that bare noun antecedents are illicit (which they are not); (ii) confused the crucial
item with one of its homonyms; (iii) failed to establish that Baker events are rare; and
(iv) shifted their assumptions about the acquirendum from study to study. In conse-
quence, the results obtained have agreed neither with each other, nor with linguists’ as-
sumptions about what was to be shown, nor with what (under our analysis) actually has
to be acquired.
7. CONCLUSION. Nothing remains of the factual basis for an argument from either
stimulus absence or stimulus poverty running along the lines Baker suggested. One
rests on refuted data and the other is entirely inconclusive.
It is worth reflecting on why anyone could think it likely that a learner would ever as-
sume a one-word limit on antecedents for an anaphor. What the learner is looking for (if
we are anywhere near right) is a meaning to assign. Glass and blue glass and pretty blue
glass that John is holding are all expressions of type <e, t>. An unbiased hunt for a type
<e, t> antecedent should be content with finding any <e, t> that fits the context. There
is no reason to think the word count should matter.
The preferential-looking experiments of Lidz et al. 2003 and the Bayesian-learning
simulations that emerged in the subsequent discussion all involved several shifts in the
acquirendum, and the whole investigation was undertaken without any reinvestigation
of the relevant English data. In consequence, neither the nativist nor the nonnativist
strands of the work arrive at any results that carry conviction. The new puzzle that
arises is how onect can be promiscuous enough to allow either a complement-taking
noun or a whole nominal to be its antecedent and supply its sense. We have provided a
formal semantic analysis that answers that question. It leaves us with no specific reason
to think that learning Baker’s positive acquirendum from the evidence is problematic:
given only that onect is identified as an anaphor of semantic type <e, t> (and even lin-
guistic nativists have to assume that much can be learned from exposure to speech,
since onect is not universal), it automatically follows that the meanings of nominals
(combinations of nouns with their dependents) will be suitable meaning donors.
It is unfortunate that the work on anaphoric uses of onect began in such a resolutely
syntactic mode. No one seems to have thought much about its meaning, or the implica-
tions thereof. The fact is that for a child capable of identifying nouns and conjecturing
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meanings for them, learning onect looks rather easy. It is a count noun with hardly any
semantic content. A phrase like a big one has a meaning something like ‘a big thing (of
the indicated sort)’. It is scarcely a mystery how a child capable of learning noun mean-
ings could learn a particularly bland and general one such as this.
Learning to use onect in particular constructions does not seem to call for anything
but positive evidence. No subtle constraint on the category of its antecedent has to be
learned: either nouns or multiword Nom will do. An of-PP, or any other PP, can com-
pose with onect when a plausible meaning results. On the basis of exposure to the range
of alternative constructions like NPs with a genitive determiner or with premodifying
nouns and adjectives, the learner will be encouraged to use them in ways that match lin-
guistic experience: use mine or my one rather than the one of me in cases of control or
possession; use the one of me sometimes with depictive nouns; and so on. The proba-
bility matching seen in young language learners’ adaptation to the speech of their care-
givers is well known. There is no reason to expect this natural process to be switched
off when it comes to learning alternations between syntactic constructions. And there is
also no reason to consider low-probability examples like the car of John or the ones of
physics as being grammatically ‘blocked’ by their more probable alternants. No syntac-
tic principle forbids these low-probability constructions; if they sound a bit odd in iso-
lation it is merely because they are less preferred.
Neither theoretical arguments in support of linguistic nativism nor experimental
work in developmental psycholinguistics can amount to much if they are based on
flawed descriptive linguistics. It is somewhat shocking to reflect on the fact that the
syntactic conditions on onect have been touted for thirty years as a prime example of a
linguistic discovery supporting the plausibility of linguistic nativism when the whole
factual basis of the case, presupposed in all the psycholinguistic work, was mistaken.
If language acquisition is ever to be scientifically understood, observation of chil-
dren’s language and child-directed speech will have to proceed in parallel with con-
trolled psychological experiments, computational modeling, and, above all, careful
description of the linguistic system that is acquired. But notice, we are not suggesting at
all that experimentation and modeling can take over and eliminate the need for theoret-
ical and descriptive linguistics. Having a sound, theoretically based description of the
linguistic system to be acquired is surely crucial if progress is to be made on explaining
acquisition. Efforts at explaining the acquisition of a linguistic system are doomed to
failure if the presupposed description of the acquired system is grossly inaccurate, as
has proved to be the situation here.
APPENDIX: DERIVATION OF a brutal murder of a taxi driver
To derive the meaning of the (attested) phrase a brutal murder of a taxi driver, we proceed by first con-
structing the translation of the of-PP, as shown in A1.
(A1) <<e, <e, t>>, <e, t>>
λO[λz[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & O( y)(z)]]]
<<e, t>, t>
λ p[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & p( y)]]
<<<e, t>, t>, <<e, <e, t>>, <e, t>>> <<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>> <e, t>
λn[λO[λz[n(λu[O(u)(z)])]]] λq[λ p[∃y[q( y) & p(y)]]] taxi-driver′
P D N
of a taxi driver
We straightforwardly apply the translation of the determiner a to the translation of the noun taxi driver to de-
rive the translation of the NP a taxi driver as in A2a. We then apply the translation of the preposition of to the
translation of the NP as in A2b. Here, the new variables u and z are of type e, the variable n is of type <<e, t>,
t>, and the variable O is of the relational type <e, <e, t>>.
(A2) a. λq[λp[∃y[q( y) & p( y)]]](taxi-driver′)
= λ p[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & p( y)]]
b. λn[λO[λ z[n(λu[O(u)(z)])]]](λ p[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & p( y)]])
= λO[λ z[λp[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & p( y)]](λu[O(u)(z)])]]
= λO[λ z[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & λu[O(u)(z)]( y)]]]
= λO[λ z[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & O( y)(z)]]]
The translation of the preposition of contains a variable O, which we take to range over the wide set of se-
mantic relations that this preposition permits. By altering the range of this variable, the analysis can therefore
in principle be extended to any other preposition.
We can then represent the structure of the full NP with the analysis tree in 32 above. The typing here forces
first the composition of the translation of brutal with that of murder, as in A3a.23 This translation is of type <e,
t>, and before it can combine with the translation of the of-PP must be shifted to the relational type <e, <e, t>>
by the relational operator 30a. This type-shifting is shown in A3b.
(A3) a. λ p[λy[p( y) & brutal′( y)]](murder′)
= λy[murder′( y) & brutal′( y)]
b. λ p[λd[λ h[ p(h) & R(h)(d )]]](λy[murder′( y) & brutal′( y)])
= λ d[λ h[λy[murder′( y) & brutal′( y)](h) & R(h)(d )]]
= λ d[λ h[murder′(h) & brutal′(h) & R(h)(d )]]
The logical translation in A3b therefore represents a relational interpretation of brutal murder.
The translation of the of-PP can then apply to the translation of brutal murder as in A4.
(A4) λO[λ z[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & O(y)(z)]]](λ d[λ h[murder′(h) & brutal′(h) & RO(h)(d )]])
= λ z[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & λ d[λ h[murder′(h) & brutal′(h) & RO(h)(d )]](y)(z)]]
= λ z[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & λ h[murder′(h) & brutal′(h) & RO(h)( y)](z)]]
= λ z[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & murder′(z) & brutal′(z) & RO(z)( y)]]
The relational variableO, which represents the range of semantic relations permitted by the preposition of, im-
poses a constraint on the instantiation ofR: whatever semantic relation is chosen to instantiateRmust lie within
this range. In A4 we represent this constraint by subscripting R accordingly, that is, R is restricted to RO.
It is then straightforward to derive the translation of the full NP by applying the translation of the indefinite
article to the translation of brutal murder of a taxi driver, as in A5.
(A5) λq[λp[∃x[q(x) & p(x)]]](λz[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & murder′(z) & brutal′(z) & RO(z)( y)]])
= λ p[∃x[λz[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & murder′(z) & brutal′(z) & RO(z)( y)]](x) & p(x)]]
= λ p[∃x[∃y[taxi-driver′( y) & murder′(x) & brutal′(x) & RO(x)( y)] & p(x)]]
The final line of A5 thus corresponds to the translation of the full NP given in 32.24
23 Nonintersective adjectives such as former will belong to type <<e, <e, t>>, <e, <e, t>>>, and their inter-
pretation can interact with the relation R. We ignore this complication here.
24 The derivation given here in which the translation of the matrix determiner applies last obviously corre-
sponds to interpretations in which this determiner, if scope-bearing, scopes over any determiner in the PP. Thus
it is compatible with an interpretation of (say) the NP every picture of a student in which a different student is
depicted in each picture. Harder to obtain are inverse scope readings, as in the interpretation of the NP a pic-
ture of every student in which there are different pictures of each student (see the discussion of the analogous
scope problem with respect to’s-genitive constructions in Vikner & Jensen 2002:200–204). Our solution, which
has affinities with the treatment of inverse scope out of NP modifiers in Steedman 2011:58–60, has the advan-
tage of generalizing to both the ’s-genitive and of-PP constructions. What is needed is for the PP of every stu-
dent to take the translation of a picture as argument, rather than just picture. This primarily requires the
translation of of to be type-shifted from type <<<e, t>, t>, <<e, <e, t>>, <e, t>>> to type <<<e, t>, t>, <<e, <<e,
t>, t>>, <<e, t>, t>>>. The translation of of will then be λn[λÔ[λq[n(λu[Ô(u)(q)])]]], where the variable Ô has
the shifted type <e, <<e, t>, t>>. When applied to λ p[∀y[student′( y) → p( y)]], the translation of every student,
this yields, after simplification, the translation of the PP of every student, viz. λÔ[λq[∀y[student′(y) →
Ô( y)(q)]]]. The relational translation of a picture will be λu[λ p[∃z[picture′(z) & R(z)(u) & p(z)]]], yielding an
inverse-scope translation for the whole NP, viz. λq[∀y[student′(y) → ∃z[picture′(z) & RÔ(z)( y) & q(z)]]]
(where RÔ = RO). In order to derive the relational translation of a picture, a type-shift is required for the deter-
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